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I. INTRODUCTION : BARBARA HALL AND HER DAUGHTERS
Barbara Hall, an administrative assistant, often arrives at work an hour
and a half early solely to check her personal e-mails1 on her employer’s
computer.2 Afterwards, “[i]n the grand tradition of Chekhov, or perhaps
‘Days of Our Lives,’ Barbara Hall carries on a dialogue throughout the
workday with her two daughters, both of whom work at an event-planning
company in Cleveland and use its e-mail system for such exchanges.”3
When she gets home from work, Barbara continues to use her workplace
e-mail account to send personal e-mails.4
Barbara Hall and her daughters are not alone. The average employee
is estimated to spend nearly an hour a day on personal Internet use.5 While
this behavior at work may be economically detrimental,6 “[v]ery few
companies today have a rule against all personal use of electronic
communication . . . . Employers are becoming more realistic about
people’s need to send an occasional personal message from work.”7 Few
companies will fire an employee solely for sending a personal e-mail from

1. “The abbreviated version of ‘electronic mail’ has been written as ‘email,’ ‘Email,’ or
‘E-mail’” yet “dictionaries have not taken a position” on which abbreviation is correct. Elaine R.
Firestone & Stanford B. Hooker, Careful Scientific Writing: A Guide for the Nitpicker, the Novice,
and the Nervous, 48 SOC’Y FOR TECH. COMM. 505, 506 (2001). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
used both “email” and “e-mail” within the same opinion. See United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct.
1830, 1845 (2008) (using email and e-mail interchangeably); compare Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007) (using email), with id. at 2698 (using e-mail).
“Newly coined nonce words of English are often spelled with a hyphen, but the hyphen disappears
when the words become widely used. For example, people used to write ‘non-zero’ and ‘soft-ware’
instead of ‘nonzero’ and ‘software’; the same trend has occurred for hundreds of other words. Thus
it’s high time for everybody to stop using the archaic spelling ‘e-mail.’” Donald E. Knuth, Email
(let’s drop the hyphen), http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/~knuth/email.html (last visited Sept.
27, 2008).
2. Katie Hafner, Putting All Your E-Mail in One Basket, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at G1.
3. Id.
4. “‘I don’t even bother with my home account any more,’ [Barbara] said. ‘When I’m home,
I log onto the work e-mail because everyone has my work e-mail address. It’s just easier.’” Id.
5. Is That Work Related?, 24 No. 5 LEGAL MGMT., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 8, 8.
6. “It’s estimated that ‘cyberslacking’ is responsible for up to a 40% loss in employee
productivity and can waste up to 60% of a company’s bandwidth!” Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working
or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54
FLA. L. REV. 289, 290 (2002).
7. Larry Keller, Monitoring Employees: Eyes in the Workplace, CNN.com, Jan. 2, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/CAREER/trends/01/02/surveillence/; see also Nathan Watson, Note,
The Private Workplace and the Proposed “Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act”: Is “Notice”
Enough?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79, 96 (2001) (“Many people take care of personal business on
company time and, for the most part, many employers do not mind this behavior as long as it is
within reason.”).
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work,8 and the modern corporate attitude toward personal e-mail in the
workplace is one of begrudged tolerance coupled with surveillance.9
From 1996 to 2006, the percentage of employers monitoring of
employee Internet use skyrocketed by more than 45%.10 As of 2006, 80%
of employers regularly monitor employee Internet use.11 “[Employer
computer] monitoring takes various forms, with 36% of employers
tracking content, keystrokes, and time spent at the keyboard. Another 50%
store and review employees’ computer files. Companies also keep an eye
on e-mail, with 55% retaining and reviewing messages.”12 While an
estimated 90% of companies that monitor employee communications
notify their employees about the possibility of monitoring,13 many
employees are oblivious to the fact that a permanent record may exist of
their Internet and e-mail use at work.14
This ignorance has resulted in serious consequences for employee
litigants. At risk are the communications between attorney and client that
have been extended special legal protections throughout history.15 This
Note discusses workplace monitoring of these privileged communications.

8. However, many companies are firing employees for e-mail misuse. “Increasingly,
employers are fighting back by firing workers who violate computer privileges. Fully 26% of
employers have terminated employees for e-mail misuse.” 2006 AMA Survey: Workplace E-Mail,
Instant Messaging & Blog Survey; see also Kim Zetter, Employers Crack Down on Personal Net
Use, PC WORLD , Aug. 25, 2006, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,126835/
article.html.
9. “[W]hile [companies] may not fire people for sending personal e-mail messages, they
keep reading them.” Keller, supra note 7.
10. Ericka Chickowski, Monitoring Employee Internet Usage, PROCESSOR, Apr. 14, 2006,
at 29, 29.
11. Id.
12. 2005 AMA Survey: Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey.
13. Kyle Schurman, E-mail & Your Legal Rights, SMART COMPUTING, July 2001, at 140,
140–41.
14. “‘Many people are unaware that a permanent record exists of their Internet and e-mail
use at work,’ says Max Messmer, Chairman of Accountemps. ‘Most organizations actively monitor
Web use by employees to ensure it complies with established corporate policy.’” Is That Work
Related?, supra note 5, at 8.
15. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1927–1928) (“Advocates equally from very ancient times could
not be called as witnesses against their clients while the case was in progress. Cicero in prosecuting
the Roman governor of Sicily regrets that he cannot summon the latter’s patronus,
Hortensius . . . .”); Ken M. Zeidner, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client
Privilege: Looking to the Work-Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320
(2001) (“The notion that an attorney may not give testimony against his client is deeply rooted in
Roman law.”).
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Generally, American16 courts have held that employers are free to
monitor17 employee computer use,18 and even government employers and
supervisors can monitor employee computer usage without probable
cause.19 Accordingly, employees who e-mail an attorney from the
workplace, or from a workplace e-mail account,20 often lose the
evidentiary protections of attorney-client privilege.21 This loss of privilege
subsequently allows an employer to forensically recover22 a current or
former employee’s otherwise privileged e-mails to use against the
employee in litigation.23 This disclosure is particularly devastating to the
employee, as these types of e-mails are often damning.24 The employee’s

16. Most European employees enjoy greater workplace privacy protections than their
American counterparts. See generally Kesan, supra note 6, at 307–11 (outlining workplace privacy
protections in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy).
17. Or not to monitor. Employers choose to monitor their employees for a variety of reasons,
but it should be noted that they normally need not do so. See, e.g., Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d
1156, 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (“The duty to monitor employee’s internet activities
does not exist.”).
18. For a critical discussion of employer-employee privacy law in the United States, see
generally Rafael Gely, Distilling the Essence of Contract Terms: An Anti-Antiformalist Approach
to Contract and Employment Law, 53 FLA. L. REV. 669 (2001), which criticizes “[t]he argument,
which according to employers has become a truism, . . . [that] since employers ‘buy’ the time of
employees, employers presumptively have the right to control all aspects of the employees’ life
while at work, and at times even outside of work.”
19. See United States v. LeBlanc, 490 F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Supreme
Court has held that “government employers and supervisors may conduct warrantless, work-related
searches of employees’ desks and offices without probable cause . . . .”).
20. “[S]ending a message over [a company’s] e-mail system [is] like placing a copy of that
message in the company files.” In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 259 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005).
21. When a federal question is being litigated in the federal courts, the attorney-client
privilege is a question of federal common law. See FED. R. EVID. 501. When a claim or defense is
governed by state law (e.g., in a diversity action) state privilege law is applicable. Id. For the
purposes of this Note, due to the sparsity of case law on the subject, cases from all jurisdictions will
be similarly considered.
22. Computer forensics is defined as “the art and science of applying computer science to aid
the legal process.” CHRISTOPHER L.T. BROWN, COMPUTER EVIDENCE: COLLECTION AND
PRESERVATION 3 (2006). “The primary focus of many computer forensics investigations is the
extraction of digital evidence . . . .” Id. at 127. Deleting an e-mail, or a file, generally does not make
it inaccessible to a skilled computer forensics expert. For the purposes of this Note, the reader need
be aware that if the user of a computer views or composes an e-mail, a forensic expert may be able
to recover the e-mail regardless of whether the e-mail was intentionally saved on the computer.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (stating the party admission exemption to the definition
of hearsay).
24. Good examples of the types of communications involved in workplace waiver cases are
(1) a draft memorandum from Plaintiff to [a corporate officer], prepared by
Plaintiff and her counsel; (2) a ‘chronology of events’ describing events
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lawyer may even be vulnerable to a malpractice lawsuit for failing to
advise the employee on how to take precautions to avoid waiver.25
The typical workplace waiver situation involves an employee, using an
employer-owned computer, communicating with an attorney regarding an
action adverse to the employer.26 The employer usually has some sort of
written policy providing notice to employees that their computer use is
subject to monitoring.27

underlying many of Plaintiff’s claims, prepared by Plaintiff and her counsel; (3)
drafts of Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint prepared by Plaintiff and her counsel; and
(4) various e-mails sent amongst Plaintiff and her counsel.
Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03-CV-6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May
15, 2006).
25. See Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Materials: Attorney Responsibility as the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV. 159, 189 & n.160
(1995).
26. See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05-Civ.-639, 2006 WL 2998671, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (describing employees Kevin Long and Ludvic Presto using their
employer’s computers “that were issued to them to perform their respective work assignments, to
send and receive e-mail messages to each other and to their attorney” regarding a civil rights action
against their employer); Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *1–2 (noting that employee Curto used an
assigned company-owned laptop to frequently e-mail her attorney concerning an EEOC complaint
against her employer); Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., No. 05-CV-1236, 2006 WL 1307882, at *1
(D.N.J. May 10, 2006) (“Kaufman and OSI, a financial software company owned by Kaufman,
initiated suit action against SunGard, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract in connection
with SunGard’s acquisition of OSI’s assets and hiring of Kaufman as a senior executive . . . . [Emails related to the litigation] were sent from and received on SunGard’s e-mail system during
Kaufman’s employment with SunGard.”); Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006) (using his employer’s computer,
employee Evans contacted an attorney for advice regarding his leaving the company and working
with a competitor); Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 695 (Va. 2007) (describing
how employee Cook used his employer’s computer to prepare, print, and delete a privileged
document to send to his attorney regarding legal action adverse to his employer).
27. See, e.g., Long, 2006 WL 2998671, at *1 (noting that the employee handbook stated that
personal use of company computers was prohibited, and that employees “‘have no right of personal
privacy in any matter stored in, created, received, or sent over the e-mail, voice mail, word
processing, and /or internet systems provided’ by [the employer]”); Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at
*1 (“Employees should not have an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
receive on the computer system. The computer system belongs to the company and may be used
only for business purposes. Employees expressly waive any right of privacy in anything they create,
store, send, or receive on the computer or through the Internet or any other computer network.
Employees consent to allowing personnel of [MWC] to access and review all materials employees
create, store, send, or receive on the computer or through the Internet or any computer network.
Employees understand that [MWC] may use human or automated means to monitor use of
computer resources.”); Kaufman, 2006 WL 1307882, at *4 (“SunGard policy . . . provided that all
emails were subject to monitoring. SunGard warned: The Company has the right to access and
inspect all electronic systems and physical property belonging to it. Employees should not expect
that any items created with, stored on, or stored within Company property will remain private. This
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In these workplace waiver cases, a schism is quietly developing. Some
courts are discreetly (and perhaps inadvertently) abandoning the
traditionally accepted narrow interpretation of attorney-client privilege in
favor of a broad protective approach on public policy grounds. Others
continue to adhere to traditional doctrine. A clash between these two
schools of thought may be inevitable. The universal application of a
rebuttable presumption that an employee has waived attorney-client
privilege could avert a direct collision between these two schools of
thought and establish a semblance of predictability in workplace waiver
cases.
Part II points out the growing and unspoken abandonment of traditional
approaches in these non-traditional cases. Part III describes the
hodgepodge of emerging case law on the subject. Part IV attempts to
identify the underlying source of difficulty in these abstruse cases. Part V
teases the logically pertinent variables out of existing case law, and uses
these variables as building blocks to construct a workplace waiver
presumption. Finally, Part VI advocates the universal adoption of this
workplace waiver presumption.
Barbara Hall’s e-mail conversations with her daughters “range from the
mundane business of trading recipes to the more textured landscape of
family illness and romantic relationships[,]”28 and would not be protected
by attorney-client privilege.29 Yet, Barbara might be surprised to learn that
if she were to e-mail an attorney to ask if she might be fired for sending
personal e-mails on company time,30 her otherwise privileged e-mail could
likely be used against her by her employer in any future litigation.31 She
would then find herself out of work, and finally forced to use a personal
e-mail account for personal e-mail.

includes desk drawers, even if protected with a lock; and computer files and electronic mail, even
if protected with a password.”); Evans, 2006 WL 2440008, at *2–3 (listing a series of provisions
in the employer’s policies and procedures manual stating that employee e-mails are subject to
monitoring); Banks, 650 S.E.2d at 695 (noting that the “employee handbook provided that there
was no expectation of privacy regarding [company computers]”).
28. Hafner, supra note 2.
29. Unless, of course, one or both of her daughters happened to be an attorney, and Barbara
contacted that daughter for legal advice.
30. To which the attorney should respond “yes.” See supra note 8. If the attorney Barbara
consulted was also her husband, she might also be able to seek the protections of the spousal
privilege. See Sprenger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of Va. Tech, 2008 WL 2465236, at *2–3 (W.D.
Va. June 17, 2008) (discussing employee spousal privilege in the workplace, and noting that “[t]he
attorney-client privilege is similar to the [spousal] privilege”).
31. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (stating the party admission exemption to the definition
of hearsay).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Traditional Approach
Attorney-client privilege protects from discovery confidential
communications made between an attorney and client for the purpose of
obtaining legal assistance.32 The purpose behind the attorney-client
privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice.”33
Yet, as discovery is intended to be broad and inclusive,34 the Supreme
Court noted in 1947 that the “privilege limitation must be restricted to its
narrowest bounds.”35 In 1961, Professor Wigmore stated that
[the privilege’s] benefits are all indirect and speculative; its
obstruction is plain and concrete . . . . It is worth preserving
for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an
obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with
the logic of its principle.36
Thus, the traditional viewpoint is that when the privilege is in question “[a]
court must balance the possibility that the privilege indirectly promotes
free and honest communication with the policy of liberal discovery to
enhance the search for truth[,]”37 with the court’s thumb on the scale
favoring waiver. In workplace waiver cases, application of the traditional
approach involves balancing the possible chilling effect of admitting the
employee’s communications against the truth-seeking value of the
communications, while construing the privilege as narrowly as possible.
B. The Modern Approach
When Wigmore and the Supreme Court originally advocated the
narrow construction of attorney-client privilege, personal computers and

32. See Bryan S. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 695, 697 (1999) (citing Dean Wigmore’s definition of the attorneyclient privilege).
33. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
34. The Court often references “the broad discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . .” Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 638 (1977).
35. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947).
36. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291 (John T.
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
37. Suburban Sew’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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e-mail did not exist.38 Technology has since revolutionized interpersonal
communications,39 and attorney-client communication now regularly
occurs in a manner and form that would be completely alien to Wigmore.
E-mail combines the accountability of a pen-and-ink letter with the
convenience of a phone call.40 It can be instantly accessed from a computer
anywhere in the world, and it has forever blurred the line between formal
correspondence and casual communication.
Hence, antiquated legal rubrics may not apply to modern legal
questions involving e-mail. In an attempt to honor the policies behind
attorney-client privilege, some courts have deemed it necessary to break
with tradition and interpret the privilege broadly.41 This broad
interpretation has created a judicial bulwark protecting employees against
what some judges view as an unfair practice by employers. If this broad
interpretation is adopted in workplace waiver cases, employers would still
be permitted to monitor employee communications, but they would be
prevented from using these communications against an employee in
litigation. Although no court has explicitly articulated this broadened
approach, at least one court has undoubtedly adopted it.42 Another court
attempted to finesse the traditional approach through explanation, while
the court’s reasoning suggested application of the broad approach.43
This broad approach to attorney-client privilege is not unprecedented.
“Historically, the attorney-client privilege subordinates the need for
information to determine truth to the need for a sphere of

38. While e-mail has arguably been around since the late 1960s, e-mail did not exist in its
modern form until 1972, when an engineer named Ray Tomlinson chose the “@” symbol for e-mail
addresses and wrote software to send the first network e-mail. Barry M. Leiner et. al., A Brief
History of the Internet, http://arxiv.org/html/cs/9901011v1.
39. See Stephen J. Snyder & Abigail E. Crouse, Applying Rule 1 in the Information Age,
SEDONA CONF. J., Fall 2003, at 165, 167 (“Computers have revolutionized the way people live and
do business . . . and email has revolutionized the way people communicate.”).
40. Just as a phone call can be made from any phone hooked up to a telephone service
provider, e-mail can be sent with ease from any computer in the world with an Internet connection
and a web browser. There are approximately one billion such computers in the world today, and
by 2015 that number will double. See Siobhan Chapman, PC Numbers Set to Hit One Billion,
COMPUTERWORLD UK, June 12, 2007, http://www.techworld.com/news/index.cfm?NewsID=9119.
As in correspondence by letter, a permanent record exists of an e-mail communication. Some argue
that the existence of these two qualities in a single method of communication is risky, stating that
“email is more like a dangerous power tool than like a harmless kitchen appliance [and] many,
perhaps most, of us have suffered the equivalent of burns, lost fingers, electric shocks, and bone
fractures.” Janet Malcolm, Pandora’s Click, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 8, 8 (book
review).
41. See, e.g., Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 20, 2007) (“[P]ublic policy dictates that [privileged] communications shall be protected
to preserve the sanctity of communications made in confidence.”).
42. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
43. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007).
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autonomy . . . .”44 Courts have been slowly backing away from the
traditional approach in certain situations since “the privilege carries
through policy purposes—encouraging attorney-client communication to
enhance compliance with the law and facilitating the administration of
justice. . . .”45
C. Possible Chilling Effects
If courts apply the traditional, narrow view of attorney-client privilege,
it is unclear whether employees would be discouraged from speaking with
counsel while at work. Nothing prevents an employee in the workplace or
at home from communicating with an attorney on a personally owned
computer,46 or via another medium of communication.47 Yet courts in
workplace waiver cases have used the argument that “personal
communications with attorneys were exchanged at the office out of
necessity arising from the long business hours at [the employee’s
workplace]”48 to tie the exclusion of evidence to the purpose of the
privilege. While one court ignored this argument for procedural reasons,49
another court used essentially the same reasoning to justify its decision to
protect privileged e-mails.50
It is clear that an overworked employee could bring a personal
computer into work and e-mail his attorney from his personal e-mail

44. Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 131 (2004).
45. In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 360 (citation omitted).
46. This observation assumes that the employee owns a personal computer, and has Internet
access. Approximately 90% of American families with an annual household income more than
$50,000 in 2003 owned a personal computer with an Internet connection. See U.S. Census Bureau,
Computer and Internet Use in the United States: 2003, at 2 (2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p23-208.pdf. This number has likely risen since 2003, and
will continue to rise. See supra note 40. Because an employee consulting an attorney to obtain legal
advice is likely to have an annual household income of more than $50,000, the underlying
assumption is reasonable.
47. Phone calls, letters, and face-to-face conversations are not yet antiquated to the point of
obsolescence. Moreover, an employee could easily purchase and use a personally owned electronic
device capable of sending and receiving e-mail, such as a BlackBerry or IPhone. Ample alternatives
to e-mail remain for an employee to privately communicate with his or her attorney.
48. Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., No. 05-CV-1236, 2006 WL 1307882, at *4 (D.N.J. May
10, 2006).
49. Id.
50. See Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at
*5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006) (“If [the employer’s] position were to prevail, it would be
extremely difficult for company employees who travel on business to engage in privileged e-mailed
conversations with their attorneys . . . . Pragmatically, a traveling employee could have privileged
e-mail conversations with his attorney only by bringing two computers on the trip—the company’s
and his own.”).
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account,51 or could pick up the telephone to speak with his attorney in lieu
of sending an e-mail. It is not unusual for an employee to routinely bring
a personal computer to work,52 and some undoubtedly already use the
telephone to communicate with their attorney while at work. Still, denying
privilege in these cases could significantly chill attorney-client
communication.
E-mail is particularly useful for legal communications,53 and forcing an
employee to bring a separate personal computer to work to ensure privacy
would be burdensome to the employee and potentially still subject the
employee to monitoring.54 Further, allowing employers to use
technologically sophisticated methods to covertly intercept attorney-client
communications could allow the employer to fold the protections of
privilege into a paper tiger.55 If an employee’s privileged communications
with an attorney can be intercepted without the employee’s knowledge and
used against the employee, the employee has a strong incentive to avoid
seeking legal advice. This is the chilling effect the privilege is designed to
prevent.

51. However, bringing in a personal computer might not be enough to avoid employer
surveillance, as the employee would likely be forced to use the employer’s Internet connection or
network to send e-mail. See supra note 20.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Mr. Barrows
brought his personal computer to work.”); Gernady v. Pactiv Corp., No. 02-C-8113, 2005 WL
241472, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2005) (“On January 22, 2001, Gernady brought his personal
computer to work even though he had previously been notified that he was not allowed to do so.”);
United States v. Murray, No. NMCCA 200501175, 2007 WL 1704288, at *1 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.
Jan. 11, 2007) (“The appellant sometimes brought his personal laptop computer to work so that he
could listen to music while working.”); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2007) (“The mechanics had begun bringing their personal computers from home, keeping
them in a closet area near the break room where the mechanics await their work assignments.”).
53. “According to the 2007 ABA Legal Technology Survey Report, more than 99 percent of
the ABA members surveyed reported using email in their practices.” Joshua Poje, Sanctions Just
a Click Away: Email’s Ethical Pitfalls, THE E-PUBLIC LAWYER, Summer 2008,
http://www.abanet.org/govpub/ePL/summer08/email.html. However, there are some critics of email. “‘E-mail is a party to which English teachers have not been invited . . . . E-mail has just
erupted like a weed, and instead of considering what to say when they write, people now just let
thoughts drool out onto the screen[.]’” Sam Dillon, What Corporate America Cannot Build: A
Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at A23 (quoting R. Craig Hogan).
54. See supra note 51.
55. “[P]aper tigers [are] fierce in appearance but missing in tooth and claw.” Bob Hepple,
Enforcement: The Law and Politics of Cooperation and Compliance, in SOCIAL AND LABOUR
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 238, 238 (Bob Hepple ed., 2002).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss5/5

10

Losey: Clicking Away Confidentiality: Workplace Waiver of Attorney-Clien

C LIC K IN G AW AY C O N FID EN TIALITY

2008]

1189

D. Intersection with the Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine,56 now codified in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,57 is derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hickman v.
Taylor.58 The doctrine is distinct from and more expansive than attorneyclient privilege.59 “[I]n [a] civil context, work-product protection is not
absolute, but is a ‘qualified privilege or immunity’”60 that protects
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable that are prepared in
anticipation of litigation by a party or by the party’s representative, unless
opposing counsel demonstrates a need for its disclosure.61
“The work product doctrine reflects a policy that attorneys should be
free to investigate all aspects of his client’s case and devise strategy and
tactics without the fear that such information can be obtained by opposing
counsel through discovery.”62 As the policy rationale behind the work
product doctrine differs from the rationale for attorney-client privilege,
“[a] split of authority exists as to whether the work-product doctrine
should be treated the same as the attorney-client privilege for waiver
purposes.”63
Because some courts treat waiver questions differently when viewed
through the lens of attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine,64 an
employee’s claim of work product protection might be stronger than the
employee’s attorney-client privilege claim in a workplace waiver
situation.65 In many cases involving employee waiver of attorney-client
privilege, the employee has also claimed that the communications were
protected by the work product doctrine.66
For example, Martha Stewart’s forwarding of a privileged e-mail to her
daughter was found to constitute waiver of attorney-client privilege, yet

56. Federal law governs issues concerning the work product doctrine in diversity cases in
federal courts. See, e.g., Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations, Inc., 176 F.R.D.
269, 276 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
57. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
58. 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1947).
59. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975).
60. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 474 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
62. Rogers, supra note 25, at 179 n.117.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 179–80 n.117.
65. This approach has not worked well for employee litigants to date. Generally, courts
finding waiver or upholding attorney-client privilege reach the same result in their work product
analysis. See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05-Civ.-639, 2006 WL 2998671, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (noting the employees waived attorney-client privilege and work product
protections by voluntary disclosure); Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03-CV-6327, 2006
WL 1318387, at *5–9 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (concluding employee is entitled to either or both
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine protections for the same reasons).
66. See, e.g., Long, 2006 WL 2998671, at *2–5; Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *2.
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was still considered protected under the work product doctrine, because
Stewart did not “substantially increase the risk that the Government would
gain access to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation.”67 However,
in Lynch v. Hamrick,68 Juanita Lynch’s privileged telephone conversations
held in the presence of her daughter received no such protection through
application of the work product doctrine.69 The contrast between these
cases illustrates how courts are particularly friendly to litigants who have
made a technological blunder.
The Stewart court reasoned that, as “‘[d]isclosure to third persons in no
way indicates a party’s intent to allow his adversary access to work
product materials, waiver is therefore not warranted.’”70 This rationale
could be extended to workplace waiver situations, especially when an
employee attempts to remove traces of the privileged materials from the
employer’s computer system. However, it is clear that the work product
doctrine has taken a backseat to attorney-client privilege. To date, all
courts addressing workplace waiver have simply lumped the two concepts
together or given work product claims token consideration.71
III. CHAOS IN THE COURTS
Courts have struggled in determining whether an employee waived
attorney-client privilege by checking an otherwise privileged e-mail on a
company computer.72 The decisions center around whether the
employee-client had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
when communicating with an attorney.73 Courts have generally taken a
67. United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
68. 968 So. 2d 11 (Ala. 2007).
69. Id. at 14.
70. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (quoting Jeff A. Anderson et al., The Work Product
Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 884 (1983)).
71. See supra note 65.
72. Compare Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05-Civ.-639, 2006 WL 2998671, at *1–3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (refusing to shield communications because employee waived privilege
by checking e-mails on company computer), and Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., No. 05-CV-1236,
2006 WL 1307882, at *1–3 (D.N.J. May 10, 2006) (reasoning that although employee deleted
privileged e-mails on company laptop that were later recovered by a computer technician, employee
had waived privilege), and Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 695–96 (Va. 2007)
(preparing an otherwise privileged communication on a company computer waived the employee’s
privilege), with Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No.C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 20, 2007) (holding that public policy demanded that employee’s privileged communications
be protected), and Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03-CV-6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at
*4–5 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (concluding employee had not waived privilege by leaving traces
of privileged e-mails on a company computer, although company policy stated all e-mails viewed
on company computer were subject to monitoring), and Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No.
04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *3–5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006) (checking e-mail on
company computer did not waive employee privilege).
73. The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure those
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fact-specific approach in determining the objective reasonableness of the
employee’s belief. The different variables that courts have considered will
be discussed in the following subsections.
A. The Employer’s Policies Regarding Computer Use
and Monitoring
Every court addressing workplace waiver has first looked to the
employer’s policies74 regarding employee computer use. Some courts have
treated policy language indicating that an employee has no expectation of
privacy on workplace computers to be a necessary condition to establish
waiver, while others have found such language to be in itself sufficient to
establish waiver.
An example of this “necessary and sufficient” approach can be seen in
Banks v. Mario Industries of Virginia, Inc.,75 in which an employee used
an employer-owned computer to prepare a memorandum for his attorney
regarding his planned resignation.76 The employee printed the letter and
sent it via non-electronic mail, and then single deleted77 the electronic copy
communications from clients to their attorneys that were part of the clients’ efforts
to obtain legal advice or assistance. The communication must be confidential for
the privilege to apply. A communication is confidential when (1) the client
subjectively believes the communication is confidential and (2) that the belief is
objectively reasonable.
PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 132–33 (2005); see also Bogle v.
McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To determine if a particular communication is
confidential and protected by the attorney-client privilege, the privilege holder must prove the
communication was ‘(1) intended to remain confidential and (2) under the circumstances was
reasonably expected and understood to be confidential.’” (quoting United States v. Bell, 776 F.2d
965, 971 (11th Cir. 1985))); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981) (“A
communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege . . . if it is intended to remain
confidential and was made under such circumstances that it was reasonably expected and
understood to be confidential.”).
74. Most employers have some sort of written policy allowing the employer to monitor
employee computer use. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In the event that an employer
had no such policy language, the lack of a policy would likely be determinative. See Transocean
Capital, Inc. v. Fortin, No. 05-0955-BLS2, 2006 WL 3246401, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 20,
2006) (upholding privilege, noting that “[the employer] did not have its own Policies or Procedures
Manual or Employment Manual setting forth the Company’s policy regarding the review of emails
on the Company’s network”).
75. 650 S.E.2d 687 (Va. 2007).
76. Id. at 695.
77. The term “deleted” has a legion of different meanings in the context of electronic
discovery. Counter-intuitively, clicking “delete” on a computer file does not actually delete the file.
It merely removes the computer’s reference mark to the document. Thus, the term “single deleted”
or “once deleted” should be used to refer to documents whose reference mark has been removed,
and “double deleted” should be used to refer to documents that have actually been overwritten and
truly been made inaccessible. See RALPH C. LOSEY, E-DISCOVERY: CURRENT TRENDS AND CASES
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of the letter.78 The employer later forensically recovered79 the
memorandum, and sought to use it as evidence against the employee.80 The
court held that since “[the employer’s] employee handbook provided that
there was no expectation of privacy regarding [the employer’s]
computers[,]” and “[the employee] created the pre-resignation
memorandum on a work computer located at [the employer’s] office[,]”81
ipso facto attorney-client privilege did not protect the deleted
memorandum from discovery.82
Most courts, however, have followed a “necessary but not sufficient”
approach. An example of this approach can be seen in Scott v. Beth Israel
Medical Center Inc.83 In Scott, a physician used his employer’s e-mail
system to write several e-mails to his attorney regarding a suit against his
employer for wrongful termination.84 While the court found that the
employee-physician had waived privilege,85 it treated the presence of
appropriate policy language86 as an important factor in determining
waiver.87 The court based its decision primarily on the policy language,
explaining that the employer’s e-mail policy meant, in effect, that the
employer looked over the employee’s shoulder each time he sent an
e-mail. Thus, the privileged e-mail could not have been sent in
confidence.88
The weight given to this variable hinges on the court’s interpretation
of the strength of the policy language. What constitutes sufficiently strong
language depends largely on the surrounding circumstances. An
employer’s blanket statement that an employee is not entitled to any
expectation of privacy may be all that is needed in some situations.89 Yet,
in another situation, an employer may need to specifically describe the
method used to monitor employees for the court to consider the language
sufficient to establish waiver.90

192–93 (2008). It seems clear that the Banks court was referring to single deletion, which is
arguably not a reasonable precaution taken to prevent the disclosure of a privileged document. See
Banks, 650 S.E.2d at 695.
78. Banks, 650 S.E.2d at 695.
79. See supra note 22.
80. Banks, 650 S.E.2d at 695.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 695–96.
83. 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 27429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 2007).
84. Id. at *1.
85. Id. at *4–6.
86. For the full text of the policy language, see id. at *2.
87. Id. at *5.
88. Id. at *3.
89. See Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va., 650 S.E.2d 687, 695 (Va. 2007).
90. See discussion infra Part III.G.
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B. Employee Use of a Password-Protected E-mail Account
In workplace waiver cases, an employee will often use a personal
password-protected e-mail account to e-mail counsel.91 In Curto v.
Medical World Communications, Inc.,92 the Eastern District of New York
considered the use of a password to be an appropriate factor in considering
whether attorney-client privilege should protect employee data stored on
an employer-owned computer.93 In National Economic Research
Associates, Inc. v. Evans,94 the Superior Court of Massachusetts found the
existence of a password to be a determinative factor.95 A California
appellate court reasoned that “[b]y proffering evidence that these
electronic documents were password-protected and placed in a folder
called ‘Attorney’ for the explicit purpose of protecting them from
disclosure, defendant satisfied the initial evidentiary burden imposed on
privilege claimants.”96
While these holdings seem to indicate that password protection equates
to privacy, this generalization is not necessarily true. “[An employee] does
not have an absolute expectation of privacy in records kept or accessed on
his workplace computer, even if password protected.”97 In Long v.

91. See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., No. 05-Civ.-639, 2006 WL 2998671, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006) (“In [the employees’ communicating with their attorney on an employerowned computer], the [employees] used private password-protected e-mail accounts.”); Curto v.
Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03-CV-6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006)
(“Plaintiff did take reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure in that she sent the emails at issue through her personal AOL account which did not go through the Defendants’
servers.”); Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006) (“Many of these attorney-client communications were conducted
by e-mail, with Evans sending and receiving e-mails from his personal, password-protected e-mail
account with Yahoo rather than his NERA e-mail address.”). But see Kaufman v. SunGard Inv.
Sys., No. 05-CV-1236, 2006 WL 1307882, at *1 (D.N.J. May 10, 2006) (“These e-mails [between
Kaufman and her attorneys] were sent from and received on SunGard’s e-mail system during
Kaufman's employment with SunGard.”).
92. No. 03-CV-6327, 2006 WL 1318387 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
93. Id. at *5, *8.
94. No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006).
95. The Evans court stated that:
The bottom line is that, if an employer wishes to read an employee’s attorneyclient communications unintentionally stored in a temporary file on a companyowned computer that were made via a private, password-protected e-mail account
accessed through the Internet, not the company’s Intranet, the employer must
plainly communicate [this] to the employee . . . .
Id. at *5.
96. People v. Jiang, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), withdrawn 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d
184, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).
97. Campbell v. Woodard Photographic, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 857, 861 n.4 (N.D. Ohio
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Marubeni America Corporation,98 the Southern District of New York
considered the use of a personal password-protected e-mail account to be
irrelevant.99 The court, referring to language in the employer’s policy
handbook, held that the employee’s erroneous subjective belief that using
a personal password-protected e-mail account equated to privacy was
inconsequential.100
Where an employer has provided in its policies that an employee has
no expectation of privacy while using an employer-owned computer,101 it
is unwise to give weight to an employee’s erroneous subjective belief of
privacy stemming from use of a personal password-protected e-mail
account, as doing so would allow and encourage the employee to
circumvent the employer’s policies.102 However, password protection may
be relevant in analyzing work product claims.103
C. Common Usage of Personal E-mail on Company Computers
In Curto, the court determined that widespread use of personal e-mail
by various employees in the workplace had bearing on the objective
reasonableness of an individual employee’s expectation of privacy in using
personal e-mail.104 The court made a specific reference to the fact that
“several other MWC employees, including its president, had personal [email] accounts on their work computers.”105
The fact that personal e-mail accounts are widely used in the workplace
does not necessarily mean that those employees expected their
communications to be private.106 This inference of privacy from common

2006).
98. No. 05-Civ.-639, 2006 WL 2998671 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006).
99. “The plaintiffs contend they used their private password-protected e-mail accounts to
communicate with their attorney, and with each other, to protect the confidentiality of their
communications. However, when the plaintiffs determined to use MAC’s computers to
communicate, they did so cognizant that MAC’s ECP was in effect . . . .” Id. at *3.
100. Id.
101. As in all the cases cited in this sub-section. See Long, 2006 WL 2998671, at *1; Curto
v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03-CV-6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
2006); Jiang, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197–98; Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 042618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006).
102. This argument presents a slippery slope. Rewarding an employee for attempting to hide
evidence seems unwise, as it rewards an employee for what essentially amounts to spoliation.
103. An employee’s use of a password protected account arguably decreases the risk that
emails would be discovered.
104. Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *3 & n.2.
105. Id.
106. Many employees may well continue to use personal e-mail accounts at work despite their
knowledge that they have no expectation of privacy in their communications, as they have nothing
to hide.
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use may be rational in exceptional circumstances,107 but it is questionable
whether such an inference is objectively reasonable.108
D. Employee Attempts to Delete Privileged Material
The Curto court reasoned that an employee’s attempt to single delete109
privileged files was a reasonable precaution to prevent inadvertent
disclosure.110 The Evans court reached a similar conclusion regarding an
employee’s attempt to double delete privileged files.111 In both cases, the
employer discovered the files.112
These attempts to delete information surely created a subjective belief
in the mind of the employee that the communication was made
inaccessible to the employer.113 Yet, in light of commonly used
technology,114 that belief was objectively unreasonable. That the employer
was able to recover the documents, even when a document was
purportedly double deleted115 illustrates this point.
107. The argument is stronger when control-group executives are in the habit of using personal
e-mail at work, as in Curto. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. It would be further
strengthened if the employee were instructed by a supervisory employee to use a personal e-mail
account for e-mails, such as to send them a work-related file.
108. Where an employee was merely aware that other rank-and-file employees used personal
email at work, or where co-workers with no supervisory authority represented to the employee that
personal e-mail at work was shielded from surveillance, an inference of privacy would be less
reasonable.
109. See supra note 77.
110. Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *3. Yet, it seems clear that the Curto court was referring
to single deletion, which is arguably not a reasonable precaution “taken . . . to prevent inadvertent
disclosure of [a privileged document] . . . .”Id.
111. Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006). Evans is a great example of a technologically unsophisticated
person attempting to double delete a file. The employee deleted all his personal files and ran a disk
defragmenter under the false assumption that running the program would prevent recovery of his
files. Id.
112. See Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *1; Evans, 2006 WL 2440008, at *2.
113. Otherwise, why would the employee bother to delete the file? While the employee might
argue that the deletion was merely an attempt to eliminate e-mail clutter, this sort of housekeeping
deletion would still create the subjective belief that the e-mail was made inaccessible to their
employer.
114. Recovery of deleted data from computers through the use of forensic software has been
commonplace since the early 1990s. See David W. Hendron, The Continuing Evolution of
Computer Forensics, L. ENFORCEMENT Q., Winter 2005–2006, at 19, 19–20.
115. With some effort, double deleted data can be recovered.
Even when data on a [computer] disk is deleted and overwritten, a ‘shadow’ of the
data might remain . . . . [This] shadow data [is the] result of the minor
imprecision[s] that naturally [occur] when data [is] being written on a disk. The
arm that writes data onto a disk has to swing to the correct place, and it is never
perfectly accurate. Skiing provides a good analogy. When you ski down a snowy
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Further, the employers in both Curto and Evans made clear that
employees had no expectation of privacy while using a work computer.116
Thus, even if the employees’ actions in Curto and Evans were to be
considered reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure, an ex
post facto measure to prevent disclosure does not automatically equate to
a showing of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy at the time
of the communication.117 The employee’s attempted deletion might be
more relevant in a work product analysis.118
E. Employer Enforcement of any Existing Policies
In upholding an employee’s privilege claims, the Curto court
considered the frequency of the employer’s enforcement of its computer
usage policy.119 The court acknowledged that no other court had previously
found this factor to be relevant,120 but stated that “it goes right to the heart
of the overriding question which guides the Court’s analysis: was [the
employee’s] conduct so careless as to suggest that she was not concerned
with the protection of the privilege.”121
The court further stated that prior cases on employee expectations of
privacy were not controlling as (1) they did “not address the
confidentiality of [an] employee’s e-mails and personal computer files
with regard to the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product
immunity[,]” and (2) “none of [the] cases involve[d] an employee working
from a home office.”122
Curto suggests that consideration of the employer’s habitual
enforcement would not be appropriate in all situations, and the court’s
slope, your skis make a unique set of curving tracks. When people ski down
behind you, they destroy part of your tracks when they ski over them but they
leave small segments. A similar thing happens when data is overwritten on a
disk—only some parts of the data are overwritten leaving other portions
untouched. A disk can be examined for shadow data in a lab with advanced
equipment (e.g. scanning probe microscopes, magnetic force microscopes) and the
recovered fragments can be pieced together to reconstruct parts of the original
digital data.
EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME 240 (2d ed. 2004).
116. See Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *1; Evans, 2006 WL 2440008, at *2–3.
117. The objective reasonability of a person’s belief that his or her communications are private
is determined at the time the communications were made. See, e.g., United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d
641, 657 (3d Cir. 1991); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
118. This conclusion follows because an employee’s attempt to delete emails likely decreases
the risk that the emails would be discovered.
119. Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *4–5.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *5.
122. Id.
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explicit limitation of its holding makes this conclusion clear.123 Moreover,
the Curto court downplayed the importance of employer enforcement,
stating that the factor was “in no way . . . dispositive” and characterizing
it “as a ‘sub-factor’ to be examined, along with [other factors] . . . .”124
Curto’s token defense justifying consideration of the frequency of the
employer’s enforcement of its computer use policy illustrates its relative
unimportance.
F. The Location of the Computer
The physical location of the computer has logical and legal significance
in workplace waiver cases. It is true that an employer-owned computer
does not cease to be employer-owned if it is taken into an employee’s
home.125 However, technologically sophisticated surveillance intruding
into an individual’s home has been frowned upon by the Supreme Court
in other contexts.126 Allowing an employee to take a computer into his or
her home, then later using information stored on that computer against the
employee, smacks of a Trojan Horse.127
In upholding an employee’s privilege claims, the Curto court was
careful to note that
[t]he Court’s holding is limited to the question of whether an
employee’s personal use of a company-owned computer in
her home waives any applicable attorney-client privilege or
work product immunity that may attach to the employee’s
computer files and/or e-mails. It does not purport to address
an employee’s right to privacy in an office computer in
general.128
By limiting its holding in this way, the Curto court indicated that a
computer’s location can be determinative. Another recent case has cited

123. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
124. Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *8.
125. The converse is true regarding an employee’s personal computer taken to work. See supra
notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
126. “The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology
to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). Kyllo
answered this question by placing harsh limitations on the warrantless use of technology to cross
the “‘firm line [of privacy] at the entrance to the house.’” Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)). Although the Kyllo case involved the Fourth Amendment and criminal
law, the Court’s articulation of its desire to protect the home against invasive technological
surveillance implies that the Court would have similar protectionist leanings in workplace waiver
cases.
127. The Supreme Court has previously frowned upon “a Trojan horse dressed up in legal
form.” NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 844 (1984).
128. Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *8 (emphasis added).
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Curto to “highlight[] the perils” of an employee using an employer-issued
computer in the home.129
A more interesting question would be posed by an employee accessing
a workplace e-mail account130 from home. It is doubtful that this scenario
would be viewed as analogous to using an employer-owned computer at
home, as the employee would have had the option to use a personal e-mail
account, and thus it would seem less of an employer-set snare.
G. The Forensic Method Used to View an Employee’s E-mails
The Evans court took issue with the method used by the employer to
monitor its employee’s e-mail usage.131 The employer in Evans used
software that routinely took “screen shots”132 of what the employee was
viewing on the employer’s computer.133 The court was shocked that this
surveillance was possible.134 Yet, the employer stated in its policy manual
that “Network administrators can read your [electronic] mail!”135 While
shocking to the court,136 this particular forensic method may be relatively
commonplace.137
While stopping short of declaring this method of surveillance per se
unacceptable, the Evans court stated that:
The bottom line is that, if an employer wishes to read an
employee’s attorney-client communications unintentionally
stored in a temporary file on a company-owned computer that
were made via a private, password-protected e-mail account
accessed through the Internet, not the company’s Intranet, the
employer must plainly communicate to the employee that:
1. all such e-mails are stored on the hard disk of the
company’s computer in a “screen shot” temporary file; and

129. Geer v. Gilman Corp., No. 3:06–CV-889, 2007 WL 1423752, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 12,
2007).
130. See supra note 20.
131. Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *4
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006).
132. “A screen shot is [an electronically] printed [or electronically stored] page depicting the
visual images seen on a computer monitor when connected to a web page.” SCC Commc’ns Corp.
v. Anderson, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1258 n.4 (D. Colo. 2002).
133. Evans, 2006 WL 2440008, at *4.
134. “This Court does not agree that any reasonable person would have known this
information. Certainly, until this motion, this Court did not know of the [possibility of] routine
storing of ‘screen shots’ from private Internet e-mail accounts on a computer's hard disk.” Id.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Id. at *4.
137. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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2. the company expressly reserves the right to retrieve those
temporary files and read them.
Only after receiving such clear guidance can employees fairly
be expected to understand that their reasonable expectation in
the privacy of these attorney-client communications has been
compromised by the employer.138
Such a detailed instruction as to how an employee is being monitored
seems unnecessary when the employer’s policy manual states “[n]etwork
administrators can read your [electronic] mail!”139 Moreover, forcing an
employer to lay out the specific technical procedure used to monitor an
employee might aid employees in circumventing the monitoring systems.
However, the Evans court’s reaction to the employer’s method of
surveillance seemed ultimately grounded in a concern for fairness.140 The
court’s holding stemmed from its belief that the method used was overly
invasive and that the employee was not given adequate notice of
monitoring.141 Thus, if a court considers a method of surveillance to be
inherently unfair,142 it may justifiably require a company to take
extraordinary steps to ensure notice.143
H. Fairness and Public Policy
The Curto court specifically considered the “overarching issue of
fairness” as a variable.144 All courts, whether implicitly or explicitly, have
considered issues of fairness and public policy. It may be that all
workplace waiver decisions are reverse-engineered to match whatever the
court feels is the fair result. The sparsity of case law coupled with rich
factual situations has resulted in malleable judicial standards. The danger
reliance on a court’s interpretation of what is fair or in the interest of

138. Evans, 2006 WL 2440008, at *5.
139. Id. at *3.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *3–4.
142. Raising the question, what exactly is an “unfair” method of surveillance? Employers use
a myriad of methods to keep an eye on employees, running the gamut from peeping over the
employee’s shoulders to keystroke monitoring and e-mail duplication and review. See supra note
12 and accompanying text. Intuitively, the more sophisticated methods of surveillance would be
more likely to be deemed unfair as they appear harsh as a natural consequence of their
effectiveness.
143. Even if a court determines a method is inherently unfair, the employer could still continue
to use that method of surveillance to watch over employees. The employer would simply be unable
to use the information gained in litigation.
144. Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03-CV-6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (citation omitted).
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public policy is that what different judges consider to be “fair” differs
wildly.
A good example of a court reverse-engineering a workplace waiver
decision based upon what it believes to be in the interest of public policy
can be seen in Sims v. Lakeside School,145 in which an employee used his
employer’s laptop to communicate with his attorney and the employer later
forensically recovered the e-mails.146 The court stated “that [the employee]
was on notice that he did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of his laptop[,]”147 yet the court held that
“[n]otwithstanding defendant Lakeside’s policy in its employee manual,
public policy dictates that such communications shall be protected to
preserve the sanctity of communications made in confidence.”148 The only
legal support cited by the Sims court for deciding the case on public policy
grounds was a ninety-two-year-old case that does not once mention
attorney-client privilege,149 thus making the court appear intellectually
disingenuous.
While the Sims court may well be correct that it is not in the public
interest to allow employers to use in litigation information gained from
spying on employees, its unilateral imposition of this policy viewpoint
with no legitimate legal support illustrates the danger of judicial
imposition of public policy judgments. As Justice White said, “[t]he task
of defining the objectives of public policy and weighing the relative merits
of alternative means of reaching those objectives belongs to the
legislature.”150 While it is important for a court to have the discretion to
consider issues of fairness and public policy, it is more important that a
court carefully consider the factual circumstances and principles of

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2007).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Although the Sims court indicates otherwise in the parenthetical following its citation:
Notwithstanding defendant Lakeside’s policy in its employee manual, public
policy dictates that such communications shall be protected to preserve the
sanctity of communications made in confidence. See e.g., United States v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336, 35 S.Ct. 363, 369 (1915)
(recognizing that the attorney-client privilege is predicated upon the belief that it
is in the public interest to encourage free and candid communications between
clients and their attorneys, by protecting the confidentiality of such
communications).

Id.
150. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 213 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
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existing law.151 Widespread judicial application of subjective
interpretations of fairness would result in chaos. It would simply be
impossible to establish any semblance of uniformity in workplace waiver
cases.
IV. MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL
A. The Knowledge Gap
Much of the difficulty in these cases stems from the employeeemployer knowledge gap.152 Most employees have an erroneous belief that
e-mail communications made on a company computer are private,153 even
though a person with a moderate technological knowledge base would
consider that belief unreasonable. Whether an objectively reasonable
person possesses moderate technological knowledge remains an open
question.
Judges are put in the unenviable position of trying to determine who
should bear the consequences of this knowledge gap.154 They are forced to
decide whether a commonly held incorrect belief is an objectively
reasonable belief. This position is made all the more difficult by the fact
that few judges have significant experience with technology,155 and some

151. Admittedly, stare decisis concerns are particularly weak in workplace waiver cases as
they involve application of evidentiary rules. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828
(1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis . . . [are at their weakest in cases] involving
procedural and evidentiary rules.”).
152. “[I]nadequacy in the law [related to employee privacy in the workplace] is primarily
based on the fact that many employees do not know the extent of their privacy rights regarding their
company-provided e-mail accounts. In fact, many employees operate under the false assumption
that personal e-mail messages sent from work are protected from their employer’s scrutiny.” Corey
A. Ciocchetti, Monitoring Employee E-Mail: Efficient Workplaces vs. Employee Privacy, 2001
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26, ¶1 (2001); see also supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
154. “Hard cases, it is said, make bad law.” Ex Parte Long, 3 W.R. 19 (Q.B. 1854, Lord
Campbell, C.J.).
155. According to Judge Posner, “[e]veryone knows that younger people are on average more
comfortable with computers than older people . . . .” Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d
940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997). It is also common knowledge that most judges do not typically take the
bench until they have practiced law for years. However, a growing number of Federal Judges are
being recognized for their technological sophistication and adroitness in handling electronic
discovery issues. These judges, including Judge David A. Baker of the Middle District of Florida,
Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, Judge Paul W. Grimm of the
District of Maryland, Judge John M. Facciola of the District of Columbia, Judge David J. Waxse
of the District of Kansas, and Judge Rudi M. Brewster of the Southern District of California, have
been referred to as electronic discovery “rock stars.” See Jason Krause, Rockin’ Out the E-Law, 94
A.B.A. J. 48 (2008).
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appear to personally identify with technologically unsophisticated
employees.156
Interestingly, when faced with ambiguity, courts that regularly deal
with technological questions rule differently in technology-related cases
than courts that do not.157 This observation suggests that the judge’s level
of technological sophistication corresponds to the judge’s interpretation of
what is an objectively reasonable level of technological sophistication.158
B. Modern vs. Traditional Approach to Attorney-Client Privilege
Some courts have adopted a modern approach to attorney-client
privilege in workplace waiver cases. These courts have broadly interpreted
the privilege in an attempt to deal with situations where these courts feel
the privilege should be upheld. They may do so either for public policy
reasons, or because they feel that the traditional approach is unable to cope
with issues involving technology. Other courts have adhered to Wigmore’s
traditional approach. While it is possible that courts adopting the modern,
broad approach have done so unwittingly, the difference of breadth has
naturally led to inconsistent holdings and will continue to do so until some
uniformity is established.159
V. THE WORKPLACE WAIVER PRESUMPTION
A. The Bright-Line Fallacy
It has been noted that “[t]o date, courts have not developed bright-line
approaches for determining when attorney-client privilege protects data
156. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
157. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 724–25
(2002) (“These findings also suggest that the more frequently judges view technology cases, the
more likely they are to adopt pro-defendant interpretations of the statute.”).
158. Id.
159. However, this inconsistency may become moot. It is possible that employee privacy
rights in the United States will broaden over time to the point that workplace waiver is no longer
an issue. Most countries outside the United States offer significantly more privacy rights for
employees, and the United States may eventually fall into line with the rest of the world and
legislatively establish broader privacy rights for employees in the workplace.
Moreover, business entities within the United States may voluntarily broaden the privacy rights
of their employees through widespread revisions to employee policy manuals. The impetus behind
this broadening of employee privacy rights may come from upper level management, and other
control group employees. Control group employees are often responsible for making decisions
regarding employee privacy and employee surveillance, and yet they themselves are employees.
Thus, there is a strong incentive for the employee-authors of employee policy manuals to broaden
employee privacy rights per the employer’s policies.
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stored on an employer-issued computer.”160 Without a bright-line
approach, courts will continue to consider a legion of variables, leading to
inconsistency. Yet, some variability may be desirable. An attempt to
produce clarity through the imposition of a forced bright-line test would
cause unnecessary rigidity.
Thus, it would be a mistake for a court, in a workplace waiver case, to
hold that either (1) privilege is always waived in the presence of policy
language stating that the employee has no expectation of privacy; or
(2) privilege is never waived as a matter of public policy. Workplace
waiver issues involve sophisticated questions of law and nuanced factual
inquiries, and they require an equally nuanced analysis to achieve a just
resolution. By teasing the logically pertinent variables out of existing
workplace waiver case law, a standardized yet nuanced approach can be
developed.
B. Distillation of Logically Pertinent Variables
It is generally accepted that in workplace waiver cases a court should
first look to the language of the employer’s policies. If the policies make
clear that the employee has no expectation of privacy while using a
workplace computer, then it is logical to establish a presumption that
privilege has been waived. This presumption could be rebutted if the
employee shows that (1) the location of the computer or (2) the actions of
the employer rendered this policy language ineffective. Depending on the
circumstances, a court might also consider analyzing the issue under the
work product doctrine.
However, problems may emerge when considering such variables as
(1) use of a personal password-protected e-mail account, (2) other
employees’ use of personal e-mail at work, (3) employee attempts to delete
or hide files from the employer, (4) the forensic method used by the
employer to recover information, or (5) any other technologically related
facts where the court is unable to easily determine the objective relevance
of the evidence.
Under the traditional, narrow construction of attorney-client privilege,
these variables are likely insignificant. Under a modern, broad approach
to attorney-client privilege, they might be pertinent. Either way, courts
need specialized outside help in these cases. Court-appointed experts,161
special masters,162 or even adversarial testimony by the parties’ competing

160. Kelcey Nichols, Note, Hiding Evidence From the Boss: Attorney-Client Privilege and
Company Computers, 3 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 6, ¶ 4 (2006), available at
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol3/a006Nichols.html.
161. See FED. R. EVID. 706.
162. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
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experts163 could go a long way in assisting in the determination of the
objective reasonableness of an employee’s belief.
By all accounts, the use of a presumption is the logical first step in
workplace waiver cases. Courts should first place the burden on the
employer to show language in its policy manual that facially establishes
that the employee had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
The employee would then be free to rebut that presumption by presenting
evidence showing that the employee had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy despite the language in the employer’s policy
manual. If the court has any doubt as to whether evidence presented by the
employee to rebut the presumption is relevant, then the court should call
in specialized outside help.
VI. CONCLUSION : ADOPTION OF THE WORKPLACE WAIVER
PRESUMPTION
Courts can and should distill existing case law to determine the
logically pertinent factual variables in workplace waiver cases, but a
jurisprudential clash may be inevitable. Courts that have adopted the broad
(modern) approach to attorney-client privilege, and those that have held
fast to Wigmore’s narrow (traditional) interpretation are on a collision
path.
The application of the workplace waiver presumption, described in this
Note, is the best way to avert a direct collision between these two schools
of thought and to achieve a semblance of predictability in these cases.
Adherents to both the modern and traditional approaches would be able to
use this presumption without compromising their viewpoints. This
presumption would give courts a workable, flexible rubric that would
prove invaluable in working through workplace waiver issues. It is clear
that the adoption of the workplace waiver presumption is the logical first
step in the development of workplace waiver jurisprudence.

163. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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